Voter Turnout Predictions Rise as Kurdistan Elections Approach; Will Boycotts Matter?

Peregraf

The upcoming Kurdistan parliamentary elections are drawing near, with various lists and independent candidates focusing on the potential impact of a boycott vote. They are optimistic about engaging voters in the elections, despite the fact that in previous instances, both the ruling parties and the opposition faced repercussions from the electorate.

As the sixth term of the Kurdistan Region parliamentary elections approaches, the coalition campaign, both new and established opposition parties, along with the ruling factions and independent candidates, are striving to address the concerns of disillusioned and protesting voters. Their aim is to alter the existing power dynamics on October 20 of this year.

The significance of this election is considerable, particularly in light of the previous elections for the Iraqi parliament in the Kurdistan Region. The Iraqi Election Commission reported that the boycott vote exceeded 59 percent, and when including spoiled ballots, the boycott rate rose to over 64 percent. Only a small fraction of supporters from both ruling and opposition parties participated in the voting process.

While no official research or polling data has been released to forecast the majority's preferences for the upcoming Kurdistan parliamentary elections, analysts and experts, considering the current political climate and shifts in electoral practices, anticipate that voter turnout may surpass 50 percent.

For the sixth round of the Kurdistan parliamentary elections, out of a total of 3,789,000 registered voters, 2,899,578 possess biometric cards and are eligible to cast their votes. This represents over 76 percent, indicating that 76 out of every 100 voters have the necessary voting cards, while the remainder will be unable to participate.

Who constitutes the boycott force?

Massoud Abdul-Khaliq, a political analyst discussing the dynamics of the boycott vote, remarked to Peregraf that the group had previously expressed their discontent regarding electoral fraud and were particularly disheartened by the fragmentation within the opposition.

He further noted that the current stance of the boycott coalition may not be well-founded, as this election represents a legitimate electoral process. The amendments to the electoral law and the emergence of new political entities will allow each party to receive a more accurate reflection of their voter support.

In a significant change for the upmcoming Kurdistan parliamentary elections, the electoral landscape has shifted from a single constituency to four, with the total number of seats reduced from 111 to 100, of which five are specifically allocated for Christian and Turkmen representation.

Abdul-Khaliq emphasized that the conduct of elections and the resulting changes could potentially motivate those who initially intended to boycott to participate. However, he cautioned that the disunity among opposition groups may dilute the impact of dissenting voices, leading to a sentiment that regardless of which party is supported, none will emerge as a dominant force capable of forming a government, thus rendering their votes ineffective and stifling any potential for change.

"The boycott force lacks organization; it is more of a spontaneous reaction rather than a well-defined position," Abdul-Khaliq explained. He contrasted past instances where citizens threatened to abstain from voting as a form of protest against the ruling parties with the upcoming elections, asserting that casting a vote is now the most significant form of opposition. He warned that non-participation would ultimately benefit the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), allowing them to retain their grip on power rather than serving as a punitive measure against them.

In the last five Kurdistan parliamentary terms, the PUK and the KDP, which have dominated the ruling coalition for over three decades, have consistently secured the highest number of seats. This election, however, sees the participation of not only these two parties and various opposition groups but also several new lists and parties that have emerged from splits within existing parties.

Abubakr Karwani, a political analyst and intellectual, asserts that the significant level of voter boycott in the previous elections reflects an escalating political crisis in Kurdistan, revealing a widespread distrust among citizens towards not only the PUK and KDP but all political entities. He notes that the prospects for meaningful change through electoral participation are severely constrained.

Karwani remarked, “Aside from the Gorran Movement, which has previously swayed voters, it is challenging for any other party to replicate Gorran's success in mobilizing the electorate.” He conveyed to Peregraf that the majority of the boycott movement consisted of voters who abstained from the elections, indicating a lack of impact and change due to a prevailing negative sentiment rather than a constructive one.

He further explained that the act of boycotting signifies a rejection of all current representatives, stating that the potential for change through civil and democratic means in Kurdistan is limited. Moreover, he warned that the absence of alternative methods to challenge the ruling powers, aside from violence, is not a viable solution and could lead to further deterioration.

In the parliamentary elections of October 2021, the boycott rate in the provinces of the Kurdistan Region reached 59 percent, with spoiled votes accounting for 64.4 percent. Out of over 3.4 million registered voters, fewer than 1.3 million cast valid votes.

The boycott rate exceeded 73 percent in Sulaymaniyah and surpassed 64 percent in Erbil.

In the 2018 Kurdistan parliamentary elections, the boycott rate, excluding spoiled votes, stood at 41 percent, with less than 1.9 million voters participating out of more than three million registered.

Karwani stated that the previous non-participation of individuals served as a means to convey a message and alleviate their conscience, a message that has indeed been received. However, he noted that this expression of dissent is articulated negatively and fails to create a significant impact. He raised a critical question regarding the inability of opposition parties to persuade the boycotting voters to participate. While he refrained from speaking on behalf of the opposition, he remarked that, as both a writer and politician, the opposition has historically struggled to unify under a common program and framework. Had they succeeded in this endeavor, they might have regained the trust of at least 20 to 30 percent of those who chose to boycott.

In this election cycle, there has been an increase of approximately 800,000 voters compared to the fifth term of the Kurdistan Parliament. However, over 23 percent of these individuals lack biometric cards, rendering them unable to vote, which contributes to the strength of the boycott and efforts to curtail its expansion.

Hogir Chato, the head of the Shams Election Monitoring Network, expressed that there are individuals indifferent to political engagement who choose not to participate. Additionally, some voters abstain due to the absence of candidates or lists that align with their needs. There exists another group, a political movement that actively discourages participation in the elections.

Chato further clarified that the concept of a boycott should not be perceived as a form of punishment, as the public recognizes that abstaining from voting does not hinder the electoral process. True punishment, he argued, occurs when individuals vote for one party while penalizing another. He emphasized that a parliament formed with the support of 80 percent of the electorate reflects a greater societal will compared to a mere 20 to 30 percent participation.

In the fifth round of Kurdistan parliamentary elections, 29 lists and coalitions took part, with only 16 lists successfully obtaining seats. In the subsequent sixth round, the competition has intensified, featuring 136 lists, coalitions, and individual candidates.

The head of the Shams Election Monitoring Network indicates that the ruling and opposition forces struggle to believe in the effectiveness of the boycott due to a segment of the population that remains indifferent to participating in elections, a situation referred to as a democratic crisis. Additionally, the elections in Kurdistan have failed to effect meaningful changes in the lives of citizens; instead, political parties treat the electoral process as a mere celebration, returning to parliament without addressing the needs of the populace.

Reports from the PAY Institute, a civil society organization that monitors parliamentary activities, reveal that during the fifth term of the Kurdistan parliament, which commenced in 2018 and concluded in May 2023, only 46 laws were enacted. Notably, seven of these laws were passed during an extension of the parliament's term, which the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court has deemed null and void.

Chato asserts that this pattern has persisted for several years, leading political parties to struggle in convincing the public to vote for them and effect change, as they have previously failed to deliver. He believes that traditional Kurdish ruling parties are actively working to discourage public participation in the electoral process, as a lack of voters would enable them to execute their agendas without opposition.

Lifting the boycott

Addressing the issue of the boycott, Karwani notes that many individuals have received their voting cards and are engaging in the elections due to recent changes, including reforms in the Iraqi Election Commission overseeing the elections, amendments to the law, and the emergence of new political forces.

The political observer suggests that the dynamics have shifted, with the power struggle between the PUK and KDP intensifying, which serves as a motivation for increased public participation in the electoral process.

The Iraqi High Election Commission reports that there are 1,191 candidates in total, which includes 38 candidates representing Christian and Turkmen quotas, as well as several independent candidates not affiliated with any political party.

Massoud Abdulkhaliq asserts that the PUK may be the only entity capable of reconciling the electoral process. However, there remains apprehension that the PUK might ultimately align with the KDP to establish a new government, leading to a sense of disillusionment among voters.

In practice, the Kurdistan Region is characterized by a division into two distinct zones, referred to as yellow and green, despite the government being formed through the collaboration of the PUK, KDP, Gorran, and other parties, including the Socialists, Turkmen, and Christian groups.

Abdulkhaliq notes that the prevailing sentiment regarding the boycott of the elections may shift in the upcoming two weeks, contingent upon the campaign's trajectory. If opposition forces can assure voters that they will facilitate the formation of a government, this could enhance participation among those considering a boycott. He emphasizes that any party capable of mobilizing the boycott vote will likely secure the highest number of votes.

The trend of boycotting elections is not confined to the Kurdistan Region; it has also been prevalent throughout Iraq in previous parliamentary elections, where the boycott vote has consistently dominated.

Abdulkhaliq highlights the public's fatigue with the current circumstances and their desire for change, suggesting that any political force capable of delivering such change is likely to achieve a majority. He further states that if voter participation reaches 65 percent, significant transformations are expected.

The election law, along with the regulations set forth by the Iraqi Independent Elections Commission, does not impose any specific requirements regarding voter turnout. It permits only those individuals possessing biometric cards to cast their votes, excluding the older electronic voting cards, and other official identification documents such as citizenship, civil status, or national cards.

The Head of Shams Network expresses a lack of optimism, stating, "There are indications that voter turnout may decline with each successive election, yet there remains a possibility for improvement." He emphasizes that we are at the outset of the election campaign and must observe in the upcoming days whether the rhetoric of the political parties will influence an increase in voter participation.

The election campaign commenced on September 25, 2024, and will extend until late October 15, 2024, just days before the special vote scheduled for October 18, followed by the general election on October 20, 2024.

Change by means of boycott votes

Regarding the impact of a boycott on voting, Karwani asserts, "Active engagement from the populace can alter the existing two-party dominance of the PUK and KDP." He believes that a boycott could disrupt the current political stalemate by allowing emerging political forces to gain traction, thereby establishing a new governance and decision-making framework. Karwani further contends that it will be challenging for the PUK and KDP to form the next government of the Kurdistan Region.

In addition to individuals lacking biometric cards, there exists a segment of voters who are not officially registered and do not possess either biometric or traditional cards. Moreover, there are thousands of voters categorized as unaffiliated, who have yet to determine their participation in the election or their support for any specific candidate.

Karwani notes that the historical fragmentation of opposition forces has adversely affected voter turnout, and he warns that a boycott could similarly impact this election. He suggests that had the opposition united prior to the election, the circumstances might have been different. "At the very least, they could articulate a shared vision post-election, which might motivate some voters to engage in the electoral process."

In the upcoming Kurdistan Parliamentary elections, the primary political parties within the Kurdistan Region, along with newer entrants in the coalition, are primarily focused on their individual agendas, often opposing one another. Some parties are actively campaigning for power, while others have publicly declared their opposition stance.

Massoud Abdulkhaliq expressed that there was an initial belief that public participation would be higher this time around, prompting efforts to unite the opposition parties into a cohesive front. "Regrettably, the opposition forces lacked both unity and a shared understanding at this level, resulting in the political landscape being once again dominated by the PUK and KDP."

The sixth round of parliamentary elections in Kurdistan occurs during a period marked by a legislative power vacuum that has persisted for several years. This situation arose after the Iraqi Federal Court annulled the extension of the Kurdistan Parliament, amended the relevant laws, and mandated that the Independent High Electoral Commission of Iraq oversee the electoral process. This development is a consequence of ongoing disputes among the parties in the Kurdistan region, particularly between the PUK and KDP, which have remained unresolved for several months.

Political analyst Abdulkhaliq noted, "The PUK has faced losses over the past several years; however, this time it is anticipated to secure a victory, while the KDP may experience a decline in seats. This prediction is based on the outcomes of elections held in Kurdish areas outside the Kurdistan region."