Kurdistan Region’s Opposition Fails to Form United Front Ahead of Iraq’s Parliamentary Elections
Peregraf
After more than two months of effort and three rounds of intensive negotiations, opposition parties in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region have failed to form a unified electoral alliance for the upcoming parliamentary elections on November 11, 2025. The collapse means each party will now compete independently—a major setback that analysts say could significantly weaken their collective political influence.
Even attempts to form smaller coalitions among some of these parties ultimately failed, Peregraf has learned.
Failed Negotiations
Discussions to create a broad alliance of opposition forces, independent figures, and voters disillusioned with the dominance of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) began in March 2025. On May 10, six opposition parties and several independent personalities met for what was supposed to be the final round of talks. Yet, within just 24 hours, the initiative fell apart.
After extensive consultations, all participating parties confirmed the failure of negotiations. Each will now run on its own electoral list.
Key participants included:
• The New Generation Movement (Newey Nwê)
• The Kurdistan Islamic Union (Yekgirtu)
• The Kurdistan Justice Group (Komal)
• The National Stance Movement (Rewti Halwest)
• The People's Front (Baray Gel)
• The Kurdistan Islamic Relations Movement (Bizûtnewey Peywendîy Îslamî)
• Former Speaker of the Kurdistan Parliament Dr. Yusuf Mohammed
• Former MPs, including Dr. Bahar Mahmoud, Mahmoud Reza, Hoshyar Abdullah, and Dr. Karwan Hama Salih
Mustafa Abdullah, a member of the Kurdistan Islamic Union’s (Yekgirtu) delegation in the alliance talks, told Peregraf, “The effort to form the alliance has failed. We’re no longer in talks with any party and will contest the elections independently.” Similarly, Faruq Ali of the Kurdistan Justice Group (Komal) said, “Our party’s leadership council will meet to decide how we’ll participate in the elections.”
This development comes on the final day for parties to register their electoral lists and coalitions with Iraq’s Independent High Electoral Commission, which has already extended the deadline three times and confirmed no further extensions will be granted.
Consequences of Failure
A Peregraf investigation reveals that the opposition’s fragmentation could collectively cost them over 150,000 votes. Under Iraq’s new electoral system—which has shifted from the "Largest Remainder" method to the Sainte-Laguë formula (using a 1.7 divisor)—smaller and independent parties face a significant disadvantage.
Political analysts predict the opposition could lose at least two parliamentary seats they might have secured through a unified front.
Several participants and insiders—some speaking anonymously—told Peregraf that the collapse resulted mainly from a “lack of trust” and the “unauthorized leaking of internal documents to the media.” Some even suggested possible “external interference.”
One source said, “Negotiations were progressing until confidential proposals were leaked to the media, seriously damaging trust.” Talks that began in early March culminated in a full meeting in May, where initial signs of cooperation had seemed promising.
The first joint meeting, held on May 10 in Sulaymaniyah, went smoothly. But by the next day, divisions emerged. The National Stance Movement (Rewti Halwest) withdrew and later publicly confirmed its exit.
Ali Hama Salih, head of the National Stance Movement, stated at a press conference, “After internal evaluations, we concluded there was no coherent national project.” Hama Salih, accused the New Generation Movement of holding parallel talks with Baghdad’s ruling coalition while participating in the opposition alliance—further eroding trust.
Faruq Ali of Komal confirmed that while all parties had agreed in principle to form a “third front” against the KDP and PUK, they disagreed on critical details. “Some insisted the alliance leader should be chosen by consensus, not majority vote,” he said. “Everyone came in with their own agenda.”
He added that there was early agreement on appointing an independent Islamic figure as alliance leader—not as a parliamentary candidate but as a symbolic figurehead. However, the New Generation Movement reportedly demanded that the leader come from within their ranks, a condition others rejected.
The third and final round of talks took place on May 12 without the National Stance Movement or Komal. Though Komal did not attend, it clarified it had not officially withdrawn.
“In that round, the New Generation raised their demands further, insisting not only on leading the alliance but also on naming the top candidates in all three Kurdistan Region provinces,” Faruq Ali said.
A senior Komal official added, “These demands left no room for negotiation. They effectively closed the door.”
Another participant told Peregraf, “Had those proposals not been leaked to the media, there might have been room to negotiate with the New Generation and ask them to compromise. They had previously shown willingness.”
What Will the Opposition Lose?
A key goal of the alliance was to consolidate opposition votes under the new electoral system, which disadvantages fragmented and smaller lists. Dr. Yusuf Mohammed, former Speaker of the Kurdistan Parliament and a coalition architect, warned of the consequences.
“Looking at the last parliamentary election in the Kurdistan Region,” he told Peregraf, “the opposition could lose around 72,550 votes in Erbil, 50,000 in Sulaymaniyah, and over 20,000 in Duhok.”
He also projected a direct loss of seats. “Had the opposition united, we could have won at least two more seats in Kurdistan Region provinces and another in Kirkuk.”
As the registration deadline passes, attention now turns to how these parties will campaign separately while facing an electoral system designed to benefit larger blocs. The collapse represents a missed opportunity to present a credible challenge to the established political order in Iraqi Kurdistan. The failure to unify deals a major blow to Kurdish reformists and independents hoping to challenge the ruling establishment in Kurdistan Region. With internal mistrust, competing ambitions, and structural disadvantages under the new electoral law, the opposition’s path forward looks increasingly uncertain.
Projected Opposition Seats if Running Separately in 2025 Iraqi Parliament Election
If the opposition parties contest the November 11, 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections independently—without forming a unified alliance—they are projected to win the following number of seats, based on the vote shares they received in the October 2024 Kurdistan Parliament election:
• New Generation Movement: projected to win 8 seats — 4 in Sulaymaniyah, 3 in Erbil, 1 in Duhok
• Kurdistan Islamic Union (Yekgirtu): projected to win 3 seats — 2 in Sulaymaniyah, 1 in Duhok
• Kurdistan Justice Group (Komal): projected to win 1 seat in Sulaymaniyah
• National Stance Movement (Rewti Halwest): projected to win 1 seat in Sulaymaniyah
• People’s Front (Baray Gel): not expected to secure a seat, based on current vote projections
These are not guaranteed outcomes, but informed projections under Iraq’s current electoral system—specifically the Sainte-Laguë formula. With the opposition alliance now officially defunct, many observers believe that running separately will deepen fragmentation and reinforce the political dominance of the KDP and PUK.